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Tort Law-PENNSYLVANIA' ABROGATES GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, BUT
REFUSES TO ABOLISH SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of
Public Education, - Pa. -, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); Brown v. Com-
monwealth, - Pa. -, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
The fear of judicial legislation' frequently has restrained courts from
abrogating the doctrines of sovereign and governmental immunities.2
While often denounced as "anachroiism[s] without rational basis,"' 3 and
as "obsolete vestige[s] of the distant past,"4 the doctrines of governmen-
tal and sovereign immunity still remain sacrosanct in a number of jurisdic-
tions. Slightly less than half the jurisdictions have judicially abolished
these doctrines.' One of the more recurring reasons for the slow demise of
these doctrines is the repeated deference of courts to the legislature in this
area,' either because the immunity is supposedly constitutionally man-
dated' or because the immunity is so entrenched as to be tantamount to
public policy.8
1. To label a decision "judicial legislation" conjures up grave misapplication of power by
the courts. When Colorado abrogated governmental immunity in Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971), an intimation of the derogatory connotations of
this expression can be extracted from Justice Kelley's dissent: "What the court has done
today is not create 'judge made' law; it is judicial legislation which will undoubtedly create
consternation, if not more." Id. at 109, 482 P.2d at 974. Similar fears of a court having usurped
a legislative prerogative can be found in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 532,
208 A.2d 193, 216 (1965) (Jones, J. dissenting) (abrogates charitable immunity in Pennsyl-
vania).
2. While the terms sovereign and governmental have been used interchangeably when
immunity is discussed, in this study sovereign immunity refers only to that immunity enjoyed
by the state and its agencies. Governmental immunity refers to the immunity claimed by
local government units such as municipal corporations.
3. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 92 (1961).
4. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., - Pa. -. , 301 A.2d 849, 853 (1973) (Nix,
J. dissenting).
5. For a comprehensive list of the status of sovereign and governmental immunities in each
state see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 at 12-21 (Tent. Draft, March 30, 1973).
6. For articles on the comparative ability of courts and legislatures to enact reform in this
area see Green, The Thrust of Tort Law Part II Judicial Law Making, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 115
(1962); Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts,
44 TEXAS L. REV. 1254 (1966); Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform
of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1963); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963).
7. See, e.g., Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972); Biello v. Pennsyl-
vania Liquor Control Bd., __ Pa. -, 301 A.2d 849 (1973).
8. Justice Jones, dissenting in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193
(1965), suggests the public policy rationale:
However, although fully cognizant that this doctrine is "judge made" law created by
judicial, not legislative, fiat, in my opinion, this doctrine has become part of the public
policy of this Commonwealth, a public policy which, if it is to be changed, should be
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Historically, the doctrines developed along two lines, one theoretical,
and the other pragmatic.' The theoretical justification traces its origin to
the maxim, "the king can do no wrong." Courts and commentators have
misinterpreted the thrust of this maxim, inferring erroneously from it that
the sovereign possesses inherent immunity from wrongdoing."0 Neverthe-
less, states seized on the immunity concept; it supplied the rationale for
states to avoid liability when public coffers were considerably strained."
Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether the legislature or the judiciary should determine the legal status
effected by legislative action. The abolition of the "charitable immunity" doctrine will
affect adversely and seriously all charitable institutions throughout the Common-
wealth and the impact of such extinction is a matter of grave public concern. Under
such circumstances I believe that the legislature and not this Court should act in this
area. Id. at 532, 208 A.2d at 216.
Coupled with the idea that abrogation will create a serious "impact" on tort law is the
proposition that the ramifications of such impact can only be adequately grappled with by
the legislature. In Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 436 Pa. 572, 261 A.2d 607 (1970), Justice
Pomeroy in his dissent delineated three main premises for relegating abrogation to the legisla-
tive competence: first, legislative hearings provide a fact-finding process not available to the
judiciary; second, the impact and costs of governmental liability require a comprehensive
treatment which can be provided only by statute; and third, the complexity of the issue of
governmental liability necessitates a thorough yet pragmatic analysis which can only be
supplied by the legislature. Id. at 583, 261 A.2d at 612.
9. The theoretical argument for immunity appears to be the most difficult for courts to
overcome for it involves basic questions such as who is the sovereign, and what is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty. The pragmatic considerations supporting immunity are not nearly
so lofty; they primarily deal with economic questions such as whether the state or local
governmental unit can assume the burdens of tort liability. However, there is an element of
the theoretical rationale in the pragmatic argument, for courts assume that states have a
choice whether or not to accept responsibility for their actions.
10. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1924). Borchard points
out that the maxim "merely meant that the King was not privileged to do wrong." Id. at n.
2. For a more thorough treatment of the historical development of these doctrines and general
background on this topic see 3 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01 et seq. (1958);
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 29.1 et seq. (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 et seq. (4th ed. 1971); Blachly & Oatman, Approaches to Govern-
mental Liability in Tort; A Comparative Survey, 9 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 181 (1942); Jaffe,
Suits against Governments and Officers; Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1963).
11. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORT § 29.2 at 1609 (1956). These commentators
attribute the development of these immunities partially to "the heavy indebtedness of the
states and their precarious financial condition during the years immediately after the Revolu-
tion." Id. at n. 8. Likewise in Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., - Pa. - , 301
A.2d 849 (1973), Justice Nix in his dissent noted that "[b]y the end of the eighteenth
century, the States of this union had accumulated debts resulting from the War of Independ-
ence. Most chose to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity in order to avoid financial
disaster." Id. at _, 301 A.2d at 854. Lack of funds was also the compelling reason for
applying immunity to local governmental units in the original English case. Russell v. Men
of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
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of these doctrines. In two four-three decisions,'" Brown v. Commonwealth'3
and Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education,'4 the court answered
this question somewhat differently. In Brown the court adhered to the
traditional view asserting that abrogation of sovereign immunity is
uniquely a legislative function; while in Ayala the court, distinguishing
governmental from sovereign immunity, ruled that the judiciary could
abolish governmental immunity.
It is difficult to differentiate these cases on the facts. In Brown, the
plaintiff sustained injuries when the National Guard Jeep in which she was
a guest passenger, overturned allegedly through the negligence of the
driver, a Guardsman.' 5 The Ayala case involved an accident wherein appel-
lant's arm required amputation after he caught it in a shredding machine
in his high school upholstery class. The basic question in both cases was
the court's ability to circumvent these immunities.
In Ayala, the court summarily rejected the public policy argument,'"
noting that governmental immunity originated in the courts, and therefore
12. The question of abrogation has aroused some very heated debate when courts examine
this issue. Sometimes it appears that personality conflicts may arise. See, e.g., Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), in which Justice
Schauer in his dissent felt "impelled to comment that it is unfortunate that a court's reversal
of itself on a point of law which it has recently and repeatedly considered should appear to
depend upon a change of personnel. A change of court personnel is not, in my concept of
judicial duty (under our historic form of government) properly to be regarded as carte blanche
for the judiciary to effectuate either a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment."
Id. at -' 359 P.2d at 464, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
13. __ Pa. __, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
14. Pa. .,305 A.2d 877 (1973), rev'g 223 Pa. Super. 171, 297 A.2d 495 (1972). When
the Superior Court considered this case it vehemently condemned the doctrine of governmen-
tal immunity, but felt that "it is for the highest court of the Commonwealth to act to abrogate
the inequities of this doctrine. 223 Pa. Super. at 175, 297 A.2d at 497 (Hoffman, J.
concurring).
15. The court rejected appellant's argument that statutorily mandated public liability
insurance evidenced a legislative intent to reject sovereign immunity. This is not an unusual
interpretation by the Pennsylvania court. Courts have been reluctant to interpret statutorily
mandated insurance as a waiver of immunity unless such statute expressly includes such a
waiver. 57 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal, School and State Tort Liability § 57 (1971). Likewise even
when courts are willing to impose liability where insurance exists, certain problems arise. For
instance, the Illinois School Code provided that, "Any school district, including any non-high
school district, which provides transportation for pupils may insure against any loss or liabil-
ity of such district. . . ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-11a (1957) (emphasis added). The
court in Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit. Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959), acknowledged that "[tihe difficulty with this legislative effort to curtail the judicial
doctrine is that it allows each school district to determine for itself whether, and to what
extent, it will be financially responsible for the wrong inflicted by it." Id. at 17, 163 N.E.2d
at 92.
16. See note 8 supra, where the public policy rationale is developed.
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the courts could "dismantle" it." The key issue hindering the Pennsyl-
vania court from likewise rejecting sovereign immunity in Brown was its
interpretation of a constitutional provision pertaining to suits against the
state. As understood by the majority, Article I, section 11 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution permits only the legislature to determine in what cases
suits may be brought against the Commonwealth."5 The majority seemed
notably displeased with this constitutional constraint, but nevertheless felt
that no other construction of this section was permissable."1 The rationale
,for the court's strict construction of this section may be gleaned from what
the court said in an earlier case wherein it observed that such constitu-
tional provisions are ". . . in derogation of the state's inherent exemption
from suit."20 This naturally accepts the state's inherent immunity, an
assumption the dissent in Brown questions.
The Brown dissent disputes the underlying premise of the majority that
the "sovereign is the state," an entity apart as it were, from the people."
The superstructure of the majority's argument is supported by an incom-
plete base. Justice Manderino criticizes the majority for seizing solely on
the second sentence of section 11 without any reference to the rest of
Article 1.22 Thus the majority may have paradoxically engaged in a form
17. - Pa. -, 305 A.2d at 885, quoting with approval Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp.,
417 Pa. 486, 503, 208 A.2d 193, 202 (1965): "[Tlhis court fashioned it and what it put together
it can dismantle."
18. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 11 reads:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Common-
wealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by
law direct.
19. Citing the last sentence of section 11 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the
majority in Brown insists that "[n]o other conclusion is possible than that it falls to the
Legslature to determine the circumstances under which immunity may be waived (Footnote
omitted)." - Pa. at __, 305 A.2d at 870. The majority thus concluded "[w]e could not
base a contrary holding upon our impatience with the Legislature's failure to act as speedily
and comprehensively as we believe it should." Id. at _ 305 A.2d at 871.
20. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., __ Pa. , -, 301 A.2d 849, 851
(1973).
21. In his dissent, Justice Manderino suggests the possible fallacies in the majority opinion:
Those decisions [pronouncing the existence of sovereign immunity] have assumed
that the sovereign is the state, and that the state possesses inherent and inalienable
rights-the exact principles of government quillotined and buried in the human revolu-
tions that gave birth to written constitutons. - Pa. at -, 305 A.2d at 875.
22. Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution is entitled the Declaration of Rights. Refer-
ring to this, Justice Manderino declared; "The complete Declaration-its language, tone, and
thrust-concerns the protection of the people-not the state." - Pa. at -, 305 A.2d at
875. Furthermore, he concludes that to wrench one sentence from the Declaration in order
"... to protect the rights of the state-not the people-is ludicrous and violates all reasona-
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of unintended judicial legislating, while intending a strict construction of
the constitution. The dissent suggests that the majority has imputed to the
constitution assumptions that are not inherent to it. The majority has
presupposed the existence of sovereign immunity and then looked to the
constitution for substantiation of its assumptions.?
At the very least the dissent posits the idea that the constitution is not
so confining as the majority's opinion would imply. According to the dis-
sent, Article I, section 11, merely provides a procedural mechanism in
which to sue the state . 2 It should be noted that such a provision is not
unique to the Pennsylvania Constitution.? However, there is presently a
split among the courts concerning the interpretation of such clauses .2 The
majority in Brown espoused the traditional reading, which construes such
provisions as implying immunity? Yet, movement can be seen in favor of
the dissent's viewpoint, which asserts that immunity should not be read
into these clauses.2
While the whole question of sovereign immunity in Brown turned on the
constitutional limitation, for reasons not fully delineated, this limitation
was not a consideration in rejecting governmental immunity in Ayala.
Governmental immunity was attacked on the grounds that public policy
considerations no longer warrant its retention.2 9 The court followed the
ble principles of construing written language in proper context." Id.
23. Justice Manderino states, ". . . the majority's focus on three words ['in such cases']
requires a second focus of the judicial eyesight, outside the written constitution for the
discovery of a doctrine known as sovereign immunity originating in the days when authority
had to be delegated to people rather than delegated to the state; and when the state was
sovereign rather than the people." - Pa. at __, 305 A.2d at 877.
24. Justice Manderino believes that "[t]he reasonable meaning of sentence two, [of sec-
tion 11], in context, must be that it gives the legislature the right to implement procedurally
the substantive rights granted so absolutely in the first sentence of section 11." - Pa. at
-, 305 A.2d at 876.
25. IND. CONST. art. IV, § 24: "Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit
against the State, as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution; but
no special act authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person
claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16: "All
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered
without denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such
manner as may be provided by law." Wisc. CONST. art. IV, § 27: "The Legislature shall direct
by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state."
26. Compare Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969); Holytz v. City of Mil-
waukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), with Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285
N.E.2d 736 (1972).
27. See Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972).
28. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961).
29. - Pa. at -_, 305 A.2d at 881.
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simple philosophy that liability flows from tortious conduct." It went on
to dismiss fears of excessive litigation as any "justification" for retention
of this doctrine.3 1 The court found "equally unpersuasive," the allegation
that funds will be diverted from more important interests to pay claims,
or that the government lacks funds for such claims." Nothing prevents the
governmental units from acquiring some type of insurance. Furthermore,
by eliminating governmental immunity in toto, courts will no longer have
to contend with the bothersome distinctions of governmental versus pro-
prietary functions." Rejecting affirmance on the basis of stare decisis, the
court remarked that it had overcome this hurdle in other cases, for instance
in its abrogation of charitable immunity, and parental immunity.38
The question was thus reduced to who should abrogate the admittedly
unjust doctrine of governmental immunity, the courts or the legislature?
Governmental immunity in Ayala was deemed a sole creation of the courts,
with at most only a tenuous link to sovereign immunity if at all. In fact,
the distinction between these two immunities was suggested in a concur-
ring opinion in Brown, rather than in Ayala where it would appear more
to the point. In Brown, Justice Pomeroy commented that the "point of
difference" is that in the immunity of local governmental units there is "no
constitutional basis" while in cases involving the Commonwealth there is. 31
However this reasoning is not consistent with statements made by the
Pennsylvania court in other cases."
30. Id. at ___ 305 A.2d at 882.
31. Id.
32. Id. at __, 305 A.2d at 883.
33. See note 15 supra.
34. Quoting 3 K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATwE LAW TREATISME § 25.07 at 460 (1958), the Ayala
court concluded that the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions "is
probably one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law, for it has caused confusion not
only among the various jurisdictions but almost always within each jurisdiction." - Pa.
at - , 305 A.2d at 883-84. In dealing with just such a confusing situation, the Virginia
Supreme Court recently decided that where governmental and proprietary functions coincide,
the governmental function will override. Thus Virginia has actually strengthened governmen-
tal immunity. Taylor v. City of Newport News, 214 Va. 9, 197 S.E.2d 209 (1973).
35. - Pa. at _ 305 A.2d at 887 quoting Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486,
208 A.2d 193 (1965). The court said:
Stare decisis is not an iron mold into which every utterance by a Court, regardless of
circumstances, parties, economic barometer and sociological climate, must be poured,
and, where, like wet concrete, it must acquire an unyielding rigidity which nothing
later can change.
36. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
37. - Pa. at ____ 305 A.2d at 872-73.
38. For instance in Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960), the court
determined that the underlying principle of municipal immunity is that "officers performing
in a governmental capacity are not the agents or servants of the municipality but of the state
itself." Id. at 500, 162 A.2d at 380. Similar sentiments regarding the relationship of local
1974]
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It thus appears that governmental immunity is not as separate a legal
concept as Ayala might suggest, but that immunity is more a monolithic
concept that must be either accepted or rejected completely at both the
state and local level. As "creatures of the legislature"3 local governmental
units would appear to share in the state's immunity if any exists.
Whether the Pennsylvania court was on solid theoretical ground in over-
turning governmental immunity may not affect the impact Ayala has on
subsequent cases. What is significant is that Ayala principally examined
the traditional arguments sustaining governmental immunity and rejected
them. In effect, the foundation was laid for a later case considering sover-
eign immunity wherein a change of court personnel may readily espouse
the dissent's constitutional interpretation and thereby abolish sovereign
immunity. Likewise, Ayala may prompt the initiation of either of two
emerging patterns evident in other states after initial promulgation of
apparent sweeping abrogation by the judiciary. 0 Ayala, apart from Brown,
governmental immunity to state immunity are found among other states' decisions. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 556, 251 N.E.2d 30, 34-35 (1969), wherein the court cited
Bernadine v. New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). The New York Legislature had
waived governmental immunity of the State without any reference to subordinate agencies
such as municipal corporations. Thus, the New York court, in Bernardine, included such
instrumentalities in the waiver:
None of the civil divisions of the State-its counties, cities, towns and villages-has
any independent sovereignty (citations omitted). The legal irresponsibility heretofore
enjoyed by these governmental units was nothing more than an extension of the ex-
emption from liability which the State possessed (citations omitted). 294 N.Y. at 365,
62 N.E.2d at 605.
The Perkins court later remarked that "[ilt is of little concern to the injured party whether
the injury was caused by a city, county or state. We feel, to be consistent, the common law
principle should be applicable to all governmental units alike." 252 Ind. at 558, 251 N.E.2d
at 35. Similarly, the Illinois court reasoned: "[Slince the State is not subject to suit nor
liable for the torts or negligence of its agents, likewise a school district, as a governmental
agency of the State, is also 'exempted from the obligation to respond in damages, as master,
for negligent acts of its servants to the same extent as is the State itself.'" Moliter v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 16, 163 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1959), citing
Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
39. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu,
15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963). The author develops the relationship of governmental units to
the state:
Most governmental entities are simply creatures of the legislature and hence subject
to its plenary legislative powers. Even charter cities, which have constitutional home-
rule powers with respect to municipal affairs and hence are independent of legislative
control in such matters are well within the ambit of legislative control so far as their
tort liability is concerned. It is settled law that the conditions and limitations of tort
liability are not municipal affairs but questions of statewide concern with respect to
which the home-rule powers of charter cities are subordinated to the state statutory
control (footnotes omitted). Id. at 228-29.
40. The two patterns can be established from the Colorado experience and the California
[Vol. 8:372
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may thus be viewed as part of a broader trend in a changing concept of
tort law wherein governments recognize their potential as enormous injury-
producing agents and co-relatively assume responsibility for these inju-
ries."
M.L. K.
experience. In Colorado it appeared that the court had abrogated sovereign immunity in
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957); however,
in Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960), the court limited the intent expressed in
Colorado Racing Comm'n, and held that a county could not be liable in tort for the negligent
conduct of its agents. Such action by the Colorado court gave rise to Justice Frantz's lament
which he expressed in a dissenting opinion:
It now appears that what I considered death was only a coma, an apparent death,
which the majority have resuscitated to the extent at least that the doctrine is ambula-
tory in the field of torts. 143 Colo. at 208, 353 P.2d at 602-03.
Finally however, in three companion cases, the court was able to view the problem completely
and sweep away both governmental and sovereign immunity. Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Flournoy v. School Dist., No. 1, 174 Colo. 110,
482 P.2d 966 (1971); Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482 P.2d 965 (1971).
A different approach developed in California following Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). Here the legislature enacted statutes
relating to sovereign and governmental immunities. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 810 et seq. (West
1966). It should also be noted that after all the confusion in Colorado, the legislature eventu-
ally passed the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act restoring immunity to a large degree.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-1 et seq. (Supp. 1971). For several thoughtful studies examin-
ing the legislative response after judicial abrogation see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milie, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963); Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463 (1963);
Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Judicial Challenge and the Legisla-
tive Response, 43 COLO. L. REV. 449 (1972).
41. Considering the recent publicity surrounding the paucity of safety features in school
buses, it is quite ironic that in many states injured students may have no recourse against
the government. Thus a case such as Ayala may demonstrate the maxim, "[w]hat's good
for the plaintiff is good for tort law."
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